I lived through 15 years of civil war in Lebanon as a child.

And this is my fifth Israeli military campaign against Lebanon as well.

That's a lot of war.

And I can sit here and despair about the state of affairs, but I'm looking for the slivers of light, the slivers of opportunity.

Hello and welcome to GZERO World.

I'm Ian Bremmer, and as the world has been focused on what's happening in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab-el-Mandab and whether Iran and the United States would be able to continue to close the world's most important shipping lanes, another front in the conflict erupting in Lebanon.

It's gotten a fraction of the attention, but it could end up having an important impact on the balance of power in the Middle East.

Lebanon has spent years lurching from one crisis to the next.

Its economy has collapsed, its currency has lost nearly all of its value, and the country is still trying to recover from years of political paralysis and conflict.

But now it is facing another defining moment.

Months of devastating strikes by the Israeli military during the fighting against the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah have left more than 4,000 dead and over a million people internally displaced.

A fragile ceasefire is now in place, but it hinges on a question that has eluded diplomats for decades.

Can Lebanon actually find peace?

Because for that to happen, Hezbollah has to agree to disarm, the Israelis have to agree to fully withdraw, and the Lebanese military has to regain control of the south.

Perhaps most importantly, Iran has to agree to all of that.

Joining me to discuss all this and more, a top Middle East expert and journalist, Kim Ghattas.

She's born and raised in Lebanon and a contributing writer at the Financial Times, the author of Black Wave.

But first, a word from the folks who help us keep the lights on.

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And... If you've been wondering why the US and Israel's war with Iran has spilled into Lebanon, nearly a thousand miles away, the answer begins 40 years ago.

The year was 1982.

Israel had just successfully invaded southern Lebanon and pushed its biggest threat, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, out of the region.

But it also created a new problem for itself because the large Shia Muslim population in the south had long felt neglected by Lebanon's government.

And now much of that same community was living under Israeli occupation.

Across the region, another country saw an opportunity.

- Iran had just gone through its own Islamic revolution three years earlier.

Its new leaders wanted to export that revolution, expand their influence, and build a front line against Israel, so they sent money, they sent weapons, they sent military advisors into southern Lebanon to organize local Shia fighters, and the result was Hezbollah, the Party of God.

For the Islamic Republic, Hezbollah was one of the best investments it had ever made, because instead of confronting Israel directly, Iran now had a loyal and heavily armed proxy sitting right on Israel's northern border.

Why fight your own war when someone else can do it for you?

Hezbollah quickly grew into far more than just a militia.

It became one of the most powerful political and military forces in the region.

And for years, Israel and Hezbollah then settled into uneasy deterrence.

Both sides knew another war would be devastating, so they mostly avoided one, despite constant threats and periodic skirmishing.

But then, after the October 7th attacks in Israel, Hezbollah entered the conflict in solidarity with Hamas.

A US-brokered ceasefire largely halted the fighting back in November 2024, but the tensions never faded.

And when US and Israeli strikes then killed Ayatollah Khamenei in February of this year, Hezbollah did exactly what Iran had spent 40 years building it to do.

It opened another front against Israel in support of the regime.

And this time, Israel decided deterrence was not enough.

It launched its biggest campaign against Hezbollah in years, targeting the group's leadership, its weapons, stockpiles and infrastructure.

Airstrikes pounded southern Lebanon and parts of Lebanon's capital, Beirut, killing thousands and leaving entire neighborhoods in ruins.

Today, the hostilities have largely stopped under a U.S.-brokered ceasefire, but whether that peace holds depends on one question.

What happens to Hezbollah?

Now, the agreement calls for the group to disarm.

The Lebanese army is meant to take control of southern Lebanon, and Israeli forces to withdraw back to Israel.

Great plan on paper, the reality pretty challenging.

Hezbollah says it's not giving up their weapons.

Israel says it's not leaving until Hezbollah does, and the Lebanese government caught in the middle trying to assert authority over an organization that, let's face it, is right now more powerful than the state.

Plus Iran is saying it's not signing any long-term deal as long as Israel is still in Lebanese territory.

It is true that Hezbollah is weakened and its support base within the Shia community in Lebanon is under a lot of pressure.

But that might actually embolden the group.

Launching renewed attacks could bolster its reputation as defenders of the region against the U.S.

and Israel, kind of like the Islamic Republic and Iran right now.

Not to mention that continued fighting in Lebanon does work in Iran's interests.

I mean, if Hezbollah were really to disarm, it would mark a major geopolitical shift in the region.

But if the last four decades have taught us anything, it's that in the Middle East, ending one conflict has a way of setting up the next.

Joining me to talk about all of these possibilities, Kim Ghattas, Lebanese-born journalist and expert on the region.

Let's get to it.

Kim Ghattas, welcome back to the show.

Thanks for having me, Ian.

We're going to talk about Lebanon, I promise, but Iran, of course, is moving very quickly.

These are very interconnected.

With where we sit right now, it is not just the Strait of Hormuz, but we've also seen very recently that the Houthis have announced a blockade.

Sitting from your perch right now, who do you think actually has more leverage?

Who is succeeding more or failing less in the war, the Americans or the Iranians?

That's the million-dollar question at the moment.

I think that the scene is actually quite murky.

We see the Iranians able to inflict a lot of damage on the international, on the global economy, but still not as much as they anticipated, because oil is not at 250.

It's rising, but it did not, you know, go into stratospheric numbers.

They have leverage, they have the capacity with drones, with some missiles to really cause damage for Gulf countries, not so much on Israel at the moment, which is interesting, but definitely the global economy and the economies of the Gulf who want to move away from this state of limbo that is very damaging for their image and their long-term prospect.

So that is the leverage that Iran has.

But I would not overestimate the position that they're in.

Their own economy is, you know, sinking rapidly.

They're going to face their greatest enemy, the Iranian people, in the near future, if the Iranians want to take to the streets again after the massacres of January.

So the Iranians are not necessarily sitting pretty.

They have the capacity to inflict pain.

But they're also looking at their regional project that they've built over decades that is no longer serving them.

They hear you talking about the proxies support.

The proxies and allies like Syria, right?

So I think that is a story that is being under-told at the moment.

The impact of the loss of Syria for the Iranian axis, which provided a geographical continuous corridor from Iran through Iraq into Syria to Lebanon, that is no longer there.

Hezbollah in Lebanon is still powerful, but it is very much weakened, as in it's down but not out, as we say.

It is on the ground, it looks to be a spent force.

There are no military battles in the south with Israeli troops.

They have the same capacity to inflict damage with drones or missiles, but they're no longer a fighting force on the ground.

And then in Iraq, what is happening in Iraq is also not great news for Iran.

So that is the Iranian picture.

When it comes to the U.S., they have the firepower, they have the capacity to inflict damage to Iranian infrastructure, but they haven't been able so far to get Iran to capitulate.

And so it feels so far, or at this moment, that it's a battle of wills.

Who will blink first?

So let's switch to your native Lebanon, because of course there is a ceasefire.

We are seeing plenty of, what do you call it, skirmishing, but the reality is people are still dying.

And I mean, it seems like, in this memorandum of understanding, Lebanon was one of the more interesting pieces.

You have the Americans and the Iranians signing an agreement that requires action from Hezbollah that they aren't a party to, requires action from Israel that they're not a party to, right?

I mean, this is another part, it's another front in the war.

The Israelis are occupying territory.

Hezbollah has not disarmed.

And the Lebanese government, I suspect, is very interested in actually getting the memorandum to become real, but they're less powerful than both of these other two actors in effectuating that.

So how should we read what it was that these two sides are trying to get into agreement?

- Before I answer the question, if I may just highlight the incredible devastation that is being inflicted on South Lebanon, which is not getting enough attention.

- Which is where the Israelis have been bombing and are presently occupying.

- They're heavily bombing, not just with artillery or missiles, but also with controlled demolitions.

They plant explosives and they blow up whole villages.

And their argument is that this is to destroy Hezbollah infrastructure.

But they're turning Southern Lebanon into an uninhabited, unlivable buffer zone.

And the fear in Lebanon-- - And this is most of the one million displaced that we've seen in Lebanon as a result of that.

- As a result of that and a result of the threats against the southern suburbs of Beirut.

So you have a million people who fled both the south and the southern suburbs.

The latest update is that 400,000 people have since been able to go back home since the ceasefire early June, either to the southern suburbs or parts of south Lebanon where the Israelis are no longer operating.

But every day, Ian, every day, villages are being completely destroyed and made uninhabitable.

The infrastructure, the water, the schools, the hospitals, everything is being leveled.

And that is not getting enough attention.

But as for the MOU, it's very important to point out that Lebanon did not want to be part of that MOU.

Lebanon did not want to be part of the US-Iran negotiations.

So Lebanon has its own framework agreement now, the result of direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon in Washington.

- Which is quite unusual.

- Which is very unusual.

It's a historic first or second, because we've had something similar in 1983.

And those negotiations are very welcome in Lebanon, although the resulting framework agreement has also been criticized by the Lebanese for giving away too much to Israel in the short term.

Lebanon has very little leverage in these negotiations.

The fundamental misunderstanding between the two sides is that Lebanon sees this framework agreement as a way to get an Israeli full withdrawal from Lebanon, and Israel reads it as a long-term lease on occupying South Lebanon until the Lebanese authorities disarm Hezbollah.

And that idea that we're going to forcibly disarm Hezbollah and send Lebanese soldiers to fight Hezbollah militants who are also Lebanese, I think we need to move away from that.

This is not going to happen.

It is an idea that is prevalent in Israel.

And I've heard from thinkers and analysts in Israel that the thought in Israel is that since we have not been able to militarily defeat Hezbollah, then let's let the Lebanese fight it out with each other.

And if there's a civil war, that's fine.

That is precisely what we need to try to avoid.

And that is precisely what President Joseph Aoun is now in Washington discussing with President Trump.

There have been territorial encroachments by Israel for decades now in the West Bank, on the back of October 7th and the war now in Gaza, as well as in Lebanon and in Syria.

And all of those places, I mean, yes, the U.S.

at various times and the international community have said, "You've got to get out."

Do you think that there is an intention on the part of the Israelis to maintain some additional control of Lebanese territory as what they would call a buffer or for whatever reason, irrespective of where this is going?

- That is the fear, that Israel would like to maintain a buffer zone in Lebanon along the border between Lebanon and Israel into the Southern Bekaa Valley, linking up with Mount Hermon, which they now occupy as well, and then linking into this buffer zone that they created in the Golan Heights.

So that is a very "neat" buffer zone that would, from an Israeli perspective, help stave off any future October 7th.

- If that were to happen- - But that is not the way to secure Israel's long-term stability.

If that were to happen, how many Lebanese people that were living in that territory would no longer be able to live in that territory?

We're talking probably tens of thousands who would no longer be able to go back to their village.

I believe we're talking at least 60 villages or towns.

But I don't know the exact numbers.

But that is a sizable number for Lebanon, a country of 5 million.

So when we talk about a million displaced, that's a bit less than a quarter of the population.

What the Lebanese authorities are trying to do now, going back to the idea of the discussion about disarming Hezbollah, is to make the point that Lebanon needs a diplomatic success.

The president needs a diplomatic success that he can sell to his citizens, to the Lebanese people to demonstrate that diplomacy is the way forward for Lebanon, that diplomacy is the way that the state can be strong and the sole armed forces on Lebanese territory.

And that is where pressure on Israel and concessions from Benjamin Netanyahu are going to be essential.

And that is really the friction point now between the Trump administration and Israel.

Benjamin Netanyahu is not going to give an inch before the Israeli elections, whereas President Trump would like him to deliver something.

So what does that something look like?

And how do we sell the prospect of diplomacy and promote the prospect of diplomacy for the Lebanese people as a way to strengthen the Lebanese state?

And I think if I may just add one thing, Ian, I think that the devastation that we've seen in South Lebanon has convinced a large majority of Lebanese, including those who may have supported the idea of resistance against Israel, that this is not the way forward, and this is not a winning formula.

-Well, that's where I was going, because, I mean, of course, the other piece of this, which I haven't asked about yet, is, you know, we did have for, you know, a year, a large number of Israelis that were evacuated, that were displaced from the north of Israel.

People don't understand necessarily how much the Israeli people, the Lebanese people are experiencing these conflicts.

And so here, I understand you're saying Lebanese people are tired and they understand resistance is in the way, but you've got resistance.

They're armed and they're more capable militarily, even after all the Israeli strikes, than the Lebanese government.

- I disagree with that.

- You disagree with that?

- I disagree.

It's very easy for a group, a militant group like Hezbollah to launch a drone or to throw a missile.

It doesn't require much to destroy.

It requires a lot more to build, right?

And so I think what we're saying at the moment and what President Aoun is saying and what the Prime Minister of Lebanon is saying, Nawaf Salam, the best team possible at this junction for Lebanon, the best team that Lebanon has had in leadership in decades, really, is we want to assert Lebanese sovereignty on the territory of Lebanon.

We do not want an armed group to be operating as a state within a state.

It has suffered substantial damage and setbacks over the last year and a half of war.

It may still have weapons depots or some capacity.

There are efforts to smuggle weapons into Lebanon, which are now being interdicted.

But between interdicting weapons, between stopping illicit flows of money, between declaring some of their activities to be outside of the law, as the Lebanese authorities have done, and essentially the crucial point is delivering tangible positive results, Israeli redeployments, demarcation of the border.

Sure, but my follow-up question is, irrespective of how strong Hezbollah is today, you have a group that occupies a position of de facto authority.

How do you change that?

I mean, they still have leaders.

They still have arms.

How do you actually change that?

What I'm saying is that they are not what they used to be a year and a half ago.

- I understand that.

But that doesn't mean that they don't exist.

So what do you do about it?

You constrain their capacity to operate.

You crowd them out.

You demonstrate that diplomacy works and delivers for the Lebanese people in terms of aid, in terms of improved relations with the US.

When you have, in my assessment, up to 70%-- let's be not as optimistic.

Let's say 60%, 65% of the population of Lebanon that wants to move away from having a state within a state.

I think you have to capitalize on that.

It's not going to be an overnight solution the way that Israel envisages, that you send in the army and they have a big fight and Hezbollah's disarmed.

That is not how it's going to work.

That's not how it worked in other conflicts with the FARC or the IRA.

They're slightly different because at the end of the day-- But does Hezbollah need to be a direct part of any negotiated settlement in order for it to work, leadership of Hezbollah?

I think there are two ways of looking at that.

You have to get them on board or you have to constrain them.

And so I think the position of the Lebanese state is that they are the negotiating party.

They are the state.

So they need to get Hezbollah to understand the new regional outlook and the new rules in Lebanon.

But they don't need to agree to it.

I'm wondering why we believe that near term, any agreement that doesn't directly involve Hezbollah saying, "Okay, we'll accept this," is actually going to work.

It is going to be very difficult in the near term.

I'm not saying this is on the schedule for next month, but it has been a story that's ongoing for four decades, and so you don't resolve that in a month or in one quick negotiation.

I also think that part of the answer, as I said, lies in Tehran and how the Islamic Republic proceeds from here onwards.

But some of it also lies in Lebanon and political negotiations inside Lebanon about what Hezbollah wants within Lebanon in return for agreeing to give up its weapons.

And so that gets into some of the nitty-gritty of Lebanese politics and what other communities are willing to concede or not in return for giving more power to the Shia community in a country where the president is always a Christian, the prime minister is always a Sunni and the speaker of the house is always a Shia and parliament is divided 50/50 between Christians and Muslims.

What do you do with the hundreds of militants who will need a job?

There's a discussion about integrating them into the Lebanese army and others are saying absolutely not.

That would be like having an internal fifth column or something.

This is a Bank Syria conversation, as you know, as well.

And so all of this needs to be worked out over time.

I'm not saying that it will necessarily be successful, but we have to start somewhere.

I lived through 15 years of civil war in Lebanon as a child.

And this is my fifth Israeli military campaign against Lebanon as well.

That's a lot of war.

And I can sit here and despair about the state of affairs, but I'm looking for the slivers of light, the slivers of opportunity.

How can this work?

I'm not a policymaker, but I hope some of my ideas make sense and are being heard by people who are in positions of power.

I think also of the Iranian people, who are stuck between the threat of more war, having their country destroyed or damaged by these strikes, and stuck between that and a further entrenched leadership.

They deserve a better future as well.

Kim Ghattas, thank you very much.

Thank you for having me.

That's our show this week.

Come back next week.

And if you like what you've seen, or even if you don't, but if you were willing to voluntarily disarm for the sake of peace, why don't you check us out at GZEROmedia.com.

[music] Funding for GZERO World is provided by our lead sponsor, Prologis.

Every day, all over the world, Prologis helps businesses of all sizes lower their carbon footprint and scale their supply chains.

With a portfolio of logistics and real estate and an end-to-end solutions platform addressing the critical initiatives of global logistics today.

Learn more at Prologis.com And by Cox Enterprises is proud to support GZERO.

Cox is investing in the future, working to create an impact in advanced recycling and in emerging technology companies that will help shape tomorrow.

Cox, a family of businesses.

Additional funding provided by the Andrew Carnegie Foundation, Koo and Patricia Yuen, committed to bridging cultural differences in our communities, and... [music]